I. Introduction
There is a popular belief among policy makers that the reduction in standard working hours would lead to increased employment. The underlying idea is that since the demand for labor is fixed, if each worker works fewer hours, available work may be distributed among more people.
Recently, in many European countries, notably France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, standard working hours have been reduced. In evaluating the effectiveness of such policy, empirical research based on micro-data concentrated on the impact on people directly affected by the policy, ignoring possible spillover effects. In a household decision setting, although it is the husband who is directly affected, the spouse's work behavior may change in response to the policy. Not much is known about this potential spillover effect. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the married women's labor force participation in response to exogenous restriction on the hours worked by husbands.
With an exogenous decrease in the standard hours worked in a week, there is a possibility that employment will decrease owing to both scale effect and substitution of workers with hours and capital (Hunt, 1996, Crepon and Kramarz, 2002 ). An increase in the risk of unemployment of the primary breadwinner, or the possibility of a decrease in income from exogenous working hour restrictions may induce households to send more of its family members to search for paid work, as an insurance against such risk. This is known as "The Added Worker Effect (AWE)".
The literature investigating AWE asserts that when the husband loses his job, there is a decline in the family income which induces the wife to actively participate in the labor market (if her leisure is a normal good). Again, the unemployed husband can spend more time in home production, and this substitution effect again reduces the relative value of the wife's non-market time and induces her to work for wage 1 . But the extent to which husband and wife's non-market time are substitutes or complements is an empirical question. The AWE became a topic of considerable empirical research and debate. The empirical results are mixed. Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) showed that in a life cycle context, inter-temporal allocation of wife's labor is not affected by her spouse's transitory unemployment shock. This is because wives of husbands facing greater risk of unemployment will usually work more hours, not necessarily at the point when husbands are unemployed. As long as the income loss from a short spell of unemployment 1 See Ashenfelter (1980) for a detailed theoretical analysis.
is small relative to husband's lifetime earnings, the studies that look at the long-run relationship between husband's annual hours of unemployment and wife's labor supply will not observe any Added Worker Effect. But these long-run measures fail to capture how households respond in the short run to smooth out fluctuations in income and consumption due to the husband's transitory unemployment.
There are some studies which uncover some significant but small magnitude of AWE (Mincer 1962; Lundberg, 1985; Gruber and Cullen, 1996) . Mincer (1962) in his classic paper noted that a transitory reduction in income due to the husband's brief spell of unemployment has a stronger effect on his wife's labor supply than a permanent one. Lundberg (1985) in her seminal paper, studies the AWE in terms of employment transition probabilities of wives rather than static measure of labor supply. She looks at the unemployment uncertainty of husbands and credit constraints in generating short-term participation of wives and finds a small but significant AWE for white couples. Gruber and Cullen (2000) discussed the importance of the unemployment insurance (UI) program, while investigating the AWE in households. Their results indicate that in the absence of unemployment insurance, wives' total hours of work would increase by 30%
during the unemployment spells of their husbands. These papers investigate AWE when the husband becomes unemployed.
There is only one paper (Hunt, 1998) which addresses AWE when the spouse is affected by reduction in standard working hours. Hunt, using a German panel of [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] found that reductions in standard hours of full-time male manufacturing workers seem to have no effect on the employment rate of women, but have caused a small reduction in the hours of their female partners who were in the labor force, possibly due to complementarity of leisure between the couples 2 . The German standard work hour reduction was mostly initiated by labor unions in particular industries, was a gradual process and was always accompanied by full wage 2 Hunt (1998) in her fixed effect estimates of partner's hours on wife/partner's hours uses the male partner's standard hours as an instrument for his actual hours. The reduction in hours in Germany in a particular industry is agreed on in advance and could not be renegotiated. Her decision to participate is dependent on her expectation about her husband/partner's standard hours. This expectation, a part of the error term, can possibly be correlated with the instrument and the author didn't provide any evidence of the instruments passing the validity and nonexclusion restrictions. Moreover, the individual fixed effect estimates may be biased if there are individual specific components that vary over time and affect both the wife and husband's hour choice decision. compensation 3 . Thus it is unlikely to find any income effect for women whose spouses' hours were reduced.
The mandatory reduction in weekly working hours in France known as "Aubry's Law I" provide an excellent platform for empirical investigation of AWE due to reduction in standard hours worked by husbands. This paper contributes to the literature by using the "Aubry's Law I" as a natural experiment to identify the two dimensions of labor supply response of women when their husbands are subject to work hours restrictions: (1) probability of participation in the labor market by unemployed or inactive wives, and (2) changes in the hours worked by the wives who are already in the labor market. The exogenous assignment of treatment, which in other situations may be endogenously related to the outcome of interest, allows better estimates of AWE. Since this law is implemented across the whole economy, there is no scope of endogenous placement. As far as I know, this is the first attempt that uses natural experiment to estimate the possible AWE attributed to the work week reduction. Most of the previous studies in their empirical estimation of AWE used micro level data sets from as early as 1950 to 1994 at the latest. This paper uses more recent data.
II. The Reduction of the Workweek (Aubry's Law): A Natural Experiment
The Law Aubry I ( June 13, 1998) 
III. Estimation of the AWE in France

Data
The data from the annual French Labor Force Survey, Enquete Emploi (EE) for the years 1993-2000 is used in this paper. Approximately, 65,000 households are surveyed each year in March with one third of the sample being replaced each year. Hence all of the members in nearly 22,000
households are followed at most three times provided they do not move during this three year period. The data set includes individual specific information on demographic characteristics (e.g. Table 2 depicts average hours worked by wives conditional on belonging to the treatment or control group. It is observed that average hours worked by wives from treatment and control households are also more or less stable over time. We thus observe no differential trend in the treatment and control groups. It is hypothesized that between 1998 and 2000 Aubry's law changed the labor supply behavior of wives whose husbands had worked more than 35 hours in large firms in 1998. Figure and labor supply behavior of wives, whereas there was not much effect in the control households. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the treatment and the control group. The mean hours worked by wives in two groups are not very different from each other. The average family size is about the same and 50% of both groups earn low income 10 (less than 1.3*SMIC). The husbands and wives in the control group are on an average 4 years older than the couples in the treatment group but the age gap between the couples in both groups are same at about 2 years. There is a small difference in monthly salary earned by wives in the two groups. In terms of educational qualifications both groups are more or less similar: 39% of wives from the treatment households and 37% of wives from the control group have a post baccalaureate or technical degree 
Regression Framework: "Difference-in Difference" Estimates of the Added Worker Effect
The reduced form participation equation: Treatment is set equal to one if the husband works 36 or more hours in a large firm and zero otherwise. Yr98 is set to one if the year is 1998 and zero otherwise. In this framework the Treatment control for the general time series trend of hour changes of wives when their husbands work more than 36 hours in large firms compared to the control group. Yr98 captures how the overall economic situation affects wives of the treatment and control group in the particular year.
The interaction Treatment*Yr98, the Difference-in-Difference (DID) estimator captures the responses of wives whose husbands were affected by Aubry I compared to the wives whose husbands worked 35 or less in smaller firms and were not affected the hours restriction 12 . The dependent variable in equation (1) is the employment dummy in period t+2 for a woman who is unemployed or inactive in period t. So this equation in effect is looking at an employment status change.
In equation (2), the dependent variable is the difference in hours worked by wives from period t+2 and t. The estimate indicates the AWE estimate, i.e. how wives respond in terms of hours worked when husbands are affected by the policy compared to the control group and other years.
Even if there were no relative changes in group characteristics, controlling for wife's and husband's characteristics (H) and other variables capturing surrounding labor market and household conditions (X) might increase the precision of the coefficient of interest. I included year effects to capture any national trends in changes in hours worked by wives of the treatment group. Table 4 shows, how wives' hours of work change if husbands are affected by Aubry's Law. It is hypothesized that a wife from the treatment household, if she is not herself subject to the law, would increase her hours. At least she would not reduce them. The first column reports estimates for the whole sample of wives who are already in the labor force. Then the sample is split according to their status. They themselves may be subject to this work week restriction. The second column reports estimates for wives who work more than 36 hours in large firms. The third column shows estimates for wives who work 35 or fewer hours or in small or large firms in period t. The estimates indicate that if the husband is subject to the hours restriction, women significantly increase their weekly hours of work by more than 3 hours compared to the control group. In column 2, women who are directly affected by the Aubry's Law themselves do not respond to husband's hours restriction, as the coefficient of Treatment*Yr98 is not significant.
IV. AWE Results
AWE in Terms of Hours Worked By Wives:
12 For a detailed definition of DID, see Wooldridge (2002) . This is probably due to the fact that most women in France work in the service sector and there is not much possibility of overtime for full time workers.
For the sample of women who work 35 hours or less or in a small firm, therefore not subject to hours restriction, increase their weekly hours of work by 5 ½ hours as a response to reduction in husband's standard hours 13 . The estimate is significant at the 5% level. This finding is partly similar to Hunt's (1998) finding. She also found that reduction in standard hours of full-time male workers had no effect on the employment rate of women but lowered the hours of working women. This is possibly because in Germany, the reduction in standard hours was accompanied by full wage compensation and thus any income-induced AWE is unlikely. But in France, the affected workers would receive full wage compensation by the end of 2005 and it is likely that they suffered some income loss during the study period due to this restriction. Moreover, Coninck and Estevao (2003) found that in 1998 Aubry's law increased the transition probability 
AWE in Hours Worked and Family Income
Again, the AWE estimate may vary by the income status of the family. We again split the sample of women who themselves were not directly affected by the reduction in standard hours according to husband's salary. It is hypothesized that AWE is more prominent in families with a credit constraint. In Column one in table 5, AWE estimate for low income workers is presented.
Column 2 shows parameter estimates for the high income group. While married women in low income families increase their work by 7 hours a week in response to their husband's reduction in standard working hours, no significant response is seen from wives in high income households. The coefficient Yr98 is negative and significant. Adding Yr98 and Treatment*Yr98
indicate that the overall impact of the policy is that treatment wives from the poorer households actually increased their hours of work in 2000 compared to the control group. Crepon and Kramarz (2002) found that due to the 1982 hours reduction in France, a greater number of low wage workers lost their jobs compared to the high wage group. Even though the government discouraged laying off workers and promised to increase the monthly wage to compensate for the reduction in hours, it is possible that the income loss in low income families induced increased hours of work by wives who were not directly affected by the law.
AWE in Hours Worked and Family Size
AWE may vary by family size. Wives may be more responsive as the credit constraint rises with family size. This is because family consumption may be less flexible in larger families (fixed consumption needs that are tied to children and the dependent senior member). We split the sample of "wives not directly affected" according to family size. The first column of table 6 shows estimates for couples without children or any other dependent family member. We observe no significant response from wives when their husbands work 36 or more hours in large firm. The second and third columns show the estimates for a sub-sample of families with exactly 3 members and 4 or more members respectively. The Difference-in-Difference (DID) estimate reveals that women increase their hours of work by 8 hours and 9 hours respectively in a week for families with 3 members and 4 or more members. AWE is stronger for families with more dependent members as family size is positively correlated with the degree of credit constraint.
Gruber and Cullen (2000) also found large UI effect in the presence of younger children.
Same calculations were carried out for women who were directly affected by the reduction in hours as shown in table 7 and 8. The coefficient of interest is not significant in any of one of the specifications.
AWE in Terms Participation in the Labor Force:
Table 9 presents the probit estimates of participation in the labor market in period t+2, of an unemployed or inactive wife whose husband is subject to the hours restriction compared to a wife of an employee who is not affected. The first column reports the likelihood of participation in (t+2) of all non-participant (unemployed + inactive) wives from period t. The coefficient of the Treatment*Yr98 is negative and significant for the full sample of non-participants. These non-participant wives may have a preference for not working. Also, they may find it difficult to find employment in the presence of high unemployment in the economy. The second and third columns separately report estimates for the samples of unemployed and inactive wives in period t respectively. It is seen that the unemployed or inactive wives are unlikely to participate in the labor market if the husband is subject to the hours restriction compared to wives of employees who are not affected by the policy. The estimates are not significant. Since wives have the information that the husbands' reduced hours will be fully compensated in 2005, they probably adjust consumption instead of seeking employment. Hunt's research (1998) in Germany also found that the reduction in hours had no impact on labor force participation when the reduced hours were accompanied by full wage compensation. Gruber and Cullen (2000) found the likelihood of participation to increase by 12.7% when a woman's husband faced unemployment.
But for France, the reduction of the husband's standard hours did not induce the wife's unemployment to employment transition, but did increase the number of hours by a wife already working.
Tables 10 and 11 present probit estimates of participation in t+2 for all non-participants in period t, for different income categories and family sizes respectively. One important result is that nonparticipant wives from low income households are unlikely to participate in the market when their husband's hours are subject to restriction, as the coefficient Treatment*Yr98 is negative and significant at 5%. This result is unexpected. One possible explanation is that, these wives with husbands who are low wage workers, have fewer labor market skills (due to assortative mating).
With a rise in minimum wage, as a part of the law, these wives are less likely to find employment. Lundberg (1985) also found similar results for the black families in the United
States. Also, in the presence of a child or dependent members, the non-participant wives are less likely to participate. Larger family size (4 or more members) has no significant impact on the participation decisions of non-participant wives.
The results from French data confirm Mincer (1962) and Lundberg's (1985) central conclusion that AWE is seen in credit-constrained families due to a temporary drop in family income. This significant AWE in terms of increased hours worked by wives who are already in the market and not affected by Aubry's law can be attributed to an income decrease in the treatment households.
Compared to non-participant wives, these wives are better equipped to adjust to this income shock, and able to increase working hours, thereby maintaining their optimum level of previous consumption They find it optimal to increase hours to compensate the household income loss to some extent rather than borrowing or dissaving. But we do not observe positive and significant transitions of unemployed or inactive wives to employment due to this transitory and small income decline. This may be attributed to the forward-looking behavior of the unemployed wives as well as their labor market characteristics.
By 2005, hours reduction would be fully compensated and workers would not suffer any income loss. So probably these families adjusted their consumption expenditure during this short period of income loss and not their labor supply response. Again, it is possible that these unemployed and inactive wives lacked certain labor market skills or have other constraints and were discouraged to look for employment for this short period.
V. Robustness Check
It was mentioned earlier that the size of the control group is quite small compared to the treatment group and this might affect the precision of the estimates. To test the robustness of the results I estimated the same set of equations but used several different and alternative control groups, and a different dependent variable, namely, the following:
1. Husbands working 20-35 hours in a smaller firm 2. Husbands working 35 or less, either in large or smaller firms 3. Hours worked during the week before the survey instead of usual weekly hours
The results are presented in Tables 12-29 . It is seen that in case of first control group the results are very similar to the results already discussed. Moreover this control group consists of husbands who are working longer hours; in this respect they are more similar to the treatment group. But because of the smaller size of the control group in the sample and the arbitrariness involved in the choice, the original control group (less than 35 hours in small firm) was used in the paper. Again in case 3, the reported hours worked in the week preceding the survey for both husband and wife were used to carry out the estimation. The results from all the specifications strengthen the AWE hypothesis, albeit all the coefficients of interest are insignificant. In terms of participation, the results are very similar to the ones discussed. Usually in the literature, it is debated that hours worked a week before the survey may suffer from a measurement problem.
Since our assignment of treatment and control groups is crucially dependent on the hours worked variable, the estimates using this variable is not the optimal way to investigate the AWE issue.
There are two other potential control groups. Husbands working 35 or less hours in large firms and husbands working 35 or more in small firms (as the deadline for smaller firms were was When households where the husbands work only 35 hours or less were (in either larger or smaller firms) used as control, AWE estimates in all specifications, both in hours worked and participation specification, have the desired signs and most of them are significant. But due to the reasons cited, this is not an ideal control group. Nevertheless, it justifies the presence of AWE in terms of increased hours worked by wives when husband's hours are exogenously reduced and adds to the robustness of the estimates.
VI. Conclusion
This paper adds to the existing literature on added worker effect in several ways. It looks at married women's labor supply decisions when their husband's working hours are exogenously constrained. This empirical study emphasizes the role of credit constraint and family size in the labor force participation decision. It was observed that wives from treatment households increased their hours of work, or at least had not reduced their hours compared to the control group. There was no significant transition to employment for unemployed or inactive wives.
It is possible that even after controlling for all possible observed characteristics, unobserved differences between the treatment and control group exist and hence the estimates suffer from heterogeneity bias. In equation (2) The results demonstrate that an exogenous reduction in husband's working hours by 4 hours per week (10%) leads to an increase in wife's hours, who were basically part time workers, by 5 hours or more per week. This effect is more prominent in poor and larger families. One important objective of this law was to increase the quality of life. But it seems that the law contributed to some decrease in welfare for the poorer and larger households. This un-intended effect of the law needs more careful discussion and opens an interesting avenue for further study of the impact of Aubry's law. The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust P Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust P Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% The other controls include age and education of the spouses, regional unemployment rate, year dummies, Paris and Urban dummies. Robust p Values in Parentheses, * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
Year
Employment in Thousands Total
Men Women
